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Abstract
In a search model of production, where agents accumulate heterogeneous amounts of human
capital, an individual worker’s wage depends on average human capital in the searching
population. Following this model, the authors use a large American panel data set to estimate a
Mincerian wage equation augmented with terms for average human capital. They ﬁnd that there is
a positive and signiﬁcant spillover effect, but that the effect differs by gender and population
group (whites, blacks, and Hispanics), as well as educational status. The differing spillover effects
can only partially be explained by occupational choice.
JEL classiﬁcation: I29, J24, J31
Bank classiﬁcation: Labour markets
Résumé
Dans un modèle de recherche d’emploi formalisant explicitement la production, où les agents
accumulent des quantités hétérogènes de capital humain, le salaire individuel est fonction du
capital humain moyen au sein de la population en recherche d’emploi. En utilisant ce modèle et
un vaste ensemble de données de panel en provenance des États-Unis, les auteurs estiment une
équation de salaire à la Mincer enrichie de termes représentant le capital humain moyen. Ils
constatent l’existence d’un effet de débordement positif et signiﬁcatif, dont l’ampleur varie selon
le sexe, le groupe (Blancs, Noirs et personnes d’origine hispanique) et le niveau de scolarité
atteint. Les variations de cet effet ne sont attribuables que partiellement au métier choisi.
Classiﬁcation JEL : I29, J24, J31
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés du travail1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that wages are determined, at least in part, by
the worker￿ s human capital. Using education as a proxy for human capital,
Mincer (1974) ￿rst formalized the relationship between education and wages
at the individual level as an estimable equation, spawning a large literature.
Human capital in the surrounding labour market a⁄ects individual wages,
in addition to the e⁄ects of individual-level controls typically used in a Min-
cerian regression. While higher individual human capital raises wages, human
capital in the surrounding labour market may increase or decrease individual
wages. These labour market externalities interfere with the education-wage
relationship at the individual level.
Labour market externalities exist because worker-￿rm bargains do not
occur in a vacuum. As the supply of educated workers increases, holding all
other factors constant, the ￿price￿of educated workers, or their private return
to education, drops. In the United States, the supply of educated workers
has increased since at least 1940.1 But all other factors are not necessarily
equal. For example, two workers may produce more than twice the product
of a single worker by sharing knowledge. Human capital accumulation in a
given labour market expands the stock of information from which all workers
can draw, raising individual worker productivity in the process. Presumably,
the ￿rm will prefer to keep some of this information private, but job mobility
spreads information to rivals in the long run. Although it is not possible to
identify the spillover and supply e⁄ects separately, a consistent estimate of
the net e⁄ect of changes in a labour market￿ s human capital has profound
policy implications for public education. Public education subsidies exist (in
part) because the social return to education is assumed to be larger than
the private return (Friedman 1962). Without these subsidies, workers would
acquire a suboptimally small stock of human capital.
In the extant empirical literature, there is no consensus on the semantics
used to describe the positive e⁄ect of human capital accumulation on indi-
vidual wages. Rudd (2000) and Moretti (2004a) call it a spillover, Acemoglu
(1996) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) use the term social returns to ed-
ucation, Ciccone and Peri (2002) refer to the e⁄ect as an externality, and
Rauch (1993) considers it a public good with a positive externality. At the
heart of this debate is the propagation mechanism between human capital
1This draws on the authors￿calculations from census data.
1accumulation in a given labour market and individual wages. Our hypothesis
is that worker interaction spreads information that a⁄ects productivity and
wages. Marshall (1890), Lucas (1988), and Glaeser (1999), among others, dis-
cuss the e⁄ect on wages of human capital accumulation in the surrounding
labour market. We feel the term ￿spillover￿best describes this e⁄ect.
Three articles in the literature ￿nd evidence of positive spillovers. Rauch￿ s
(1993) was one of the ￿rst empirical studies of spillovers. Using 1980 U.S.
Census Bureau data, Rauch ￿nds positive and signi￿cant e⁄ects of city-level
gains in mean human capital on wages. Moretti (2004a) uses data from the
geocoded National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 (NLSY79), and de-
￿nes labour markets using metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). He treats
labour market human capital as endogenous and ￿nds positive and signi￿-
cant spillover e⁄ects. Moretti (2004b) extends his analysis by testing whether
￿economic distance￿between industries a⁄ects spillovers. He uses three mea-
sures for economic distance: input/output tables, patent distribution across
technological ￿elds, and patent citations. Moretti (2004b) ￿nds a positive
spillover e⁄ect that varies by economic distance, and argues that these ￿nd-
ings support the view that spillovers are related to worker interactions across
industries.
Three other articles, however, cannot ￿nd evidence of spillover e⁄ects.
Ciccone and Peri (2002) use U.S. Census Bureau data from 1970 and 1990
and also de￿ne a labour market as an individual MSA. They ￿t separate Min-
cerian regressions for each MSA and year. With these estimates, Ciccone and
Peri regress the time-di⁄erenced constant term and the time-di⁄erenced co-
e¢ cients for individual schooling on average schooling for each MSA. They
conclude that there is no spillover e⁄ect. Rudd (2000) uses pooled cross-
sections from 14 years of the March Current Population Survey and uses
states as the local labour market. He includes a state-time ￿xed e⁄ect in
a Mincerian model and regresses the ￿xed e⁄ects on various state charac-
teristics, including average education. Rudd ￿nds that average education is
not a signi￿cant determinant of the ￿xed e⁄ect and concludes there are no
spillover e⁄ects. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) use data on males aged 40￿ 49
from the 1960￿ 80 census samples and states as the labour markets. They use
instrumental variables for individual human capital and for average human
capital, and ￿nd no evidence of a spillover e⁄ect.
We enter the ongoing debate and provide further evidence that the spillover
e⁄ect dominates the supply e⁄ect. We extend the literature by estimating
spillover e⁄ects across population groups (whites, blacks, and Hispanics),
2gender, and college completion status (graduate and non-graduate). To the
best of our knowledge, we are the ￿rst to estimate separate spillover e⁄ects
across population groups or gender.2 We ￿nd that there are positive spillover
e⁄ects and that these e⁄ects di⁄er across groups. Our point estimates sug-
gest that whites have the largest spillover e⁄ects, followed by Hispanics and
blacks. Also, college graduates have larger spillovers than non-college grad-
uates, and men have larger spillovers than women. Occupational choice ac-
counts for roughly 20 per cent of the spillover di⁄erences. The remaining
spillovers may be caused by di⁄erences in worker interactions across popula-
tion groups, or gender.
The rest of this paper has the following structure. Section 2 sets out a
theoretical framework within which to interpret our empirical results. The
data are described in section 3. Section 4 presents our empirical model. The
main results are described in section 5. Section 6 o⁄ers some conclusions.
2. A Theory of Spillovers
Our model combines aspects of Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Acemoglu
(1996). A one-period economy consists of a large number of workers and a
large number of ￿rms. In the beginning, typical ￿rm j invests in physical
capital, kj, at price r, while typical worker i invests in human capital, hi.
Then each ￿rm meets one worker at random. After ￿bargaining,￿a share,
￿, of revenues accrues to workers and (1 ￿ ￿) to ￿rms. Finally, a random
production shock, "j, occurs for each ￿rm, with E"j = 1. All ￿rms have





j "j; 0 < ￿ < 1: (1)
Workers have idiosyncratic preferences3:








gi (1 + ￿)
; ￿ > 0: (2)
The disutility of acquiring human capital is indexed both by a term com-
mon to all workers, ￿, and by an individual term, gi, distributed uniformly
2Moretti (2004a) estimates separate spillover e⁄ects for college graduates and those
without a college degree, and Moretti (2004b) estimates separate spillover e⁄ects across
industries.
3This utility function is taken from Acemoglu (1996).
3on [0,1].4 Firms choose kj to maximize expected pro￿ts5 and workers choose
hi to maximize expected utility.6 In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
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Workers￿wages are given by:






Taking logs, we ￿nd that
lnwij = ln￿ + ￿lnh
￿
i + (1 ￿ ￿)lnk
￿ + "j: (6)
Taking expectations over the distribution of g in (4), solving for k￿ and
substituting in (6) yields an augmented Mincerian regression:
lnwij = c1 + ￿lnh
￿
i + ￿ lnE [h
￿
i] + "j; (7)





: The theory predicts that there are positive
spillovers from average education since ￿ > 0.
Up to this point, the model cannot explain why spillovers might be of
di⁄erent sizes for di⁄erent subsamples. Suppose that the economy consisted
4We assume the uniform distribution in order to present a closed-form solution. As
long as the expectation of gi exists, however, the result that individual wages depend on
average human capital still holds.
5At the time ￿rms purchase capital, they are uncertain about the human capital level
of the worker they will randomly meet and about their random productivity shock.
6As a technical matter, it is necessary to restrict ￿ and ￿ such that expected pro￿ts
are non-negative; otherwise, ￿rms would not remain in business. If ￿ > 0:5 and ￿ is small,
the non-negative expected-pro￿ts condition is satis￿ed.
4of M subsamples, each of which had a di⁄erent value of ￿, ￿m.7 Prior to the
random meeting, the ￿rm does not know from which subsample its worker
will be drawn. Let k￿
m be the Nash equilibrium capital choice for a ￿rm that
knew it was sampling from subsample m. The expression for k￿
m is the same
as that for k￿, but substituting ￿m for ￿ in the de￿nition of ￿ and using
the resulting value (called ￿m; say) in the expression for k￿. Let pm be the
population proportion of subsample m in the whole economy. It follows that
k￿ = ￿mpmk￿
m and human capital is chosen by workers based on k￿, since
they make this choice before they match with an employer. It is possible to










Substituting (8) into (6), the new wage equation contains a term for
expected human capital that depends on ￿i. Further assumptions on the pa-
rameters8 are needed to show that @V
@￿m < 0, making spillover e⁄ects positive.
The wage equation we estimate can be viewed as a linear approximation to
the one derived in the extension of the model to subsamples.
3. The Data
There are two data sources for this paper. Individual-level data come from
the 1979￿ 2000 waves of the geocoded National Longitudinal Survey of Youth,
1979 (NLSY79). State-level data are from the March Current Population
Survey (CPS). This section describes these two sources in greater detail.
Table 1 provides the sample means for the variables we use.
3.1 The NLSY79
Using information from household screening interviews in 1978, the NLSY79
includes a nationally representative cross-section plus oversamples of blacks,
Hispanics, and poor whites, and a subsample of people serving in the military.
7One can think of the di⁄erent values of ￿m as being reduced-form representations of
the di⁄erent constraints faced by di⁄erent groups in society. Since the ￿m are exogenous
in our model, we do not consider the origin of these di⁄erences.
8A su¢ cient condition is lnk > ln(￿￿).
5We do not use the military subsample because we do not believe that our
theoretical model is an adequate description of the wage formation process
for people in the military. For similar reasons, we exclude a small sample of
residents who describe themselves as self-employed. The geocode augmen-
tation is a con￿dential ￿le that includes detailed geographical information
on respondents. These data connect the respondent to their labour market￿ s
human-capital proxy.
The NLSY79 personal variables used in the empirical model are hourly
wages; population group; age; gender; tenure; married, spouse present; urban
status; and health limitations. The NLSY￿ s de￿nition of the three popula-
tion groups (whites, blacks, and Hispanics) is strictly non-overlapping.9 We
also use the following human capital variables from the NLSY79: educa-
tional attainment, mother￿ s highest grade completed, father￿ s highest grade
completed, expected highest grade completed, reason for leaving school, and
Armed Forces Quali￿cation Test (AFQT) score.10
We exclude observations for respondents who usually worked less than
35 hours per week. For all remaining respondents, we observe hourly wage
data that the NLSY79 compiles from data on earnings and hours worked.
Speci￿cally, one￿ s hourly wage is the sum of all earnings from work (e.g.,
wages, tips, and bonuses) divided by usual hours worked per week. We
create real wages using the national consumer price index-urban (CPI-U).
Thus, we interpret changes in real wages as changes in purchasing power. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the ￿rst in the spillover literature to use
real wages in place of nominal ones. Using the real wage is necessary in panel
regressions, since the nominal wage inherits the non-stationarity of the price
level.11 We omit observations in which nominal wages are below the then
9Population group data were collected during the household screening interviews in
1978. Hispanics were either self-identi￿ed as Hispanic or (i) they identi￿ed themselves as
Filipino or Portuguese, (ii) they reported speaking Spanish at home as a child, and (iii)
they had a Spanish surname identi￿ed by the census list of Spanish surnames. Blacks
were identi￿ed as black by the interviewer and are non-Hispanic. Whites were de￿ned as
non-black, non-Hispanic (NLSY 2002).
10Most of the NLSY79 respondents completed the AFQT, but this does not indicate an
intention to enter the armed forces. The AFQT score is derived from speci￿c sections of
the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB).
11In panel regressions with few observations in the time dimension, standard tests for
stationarity are impossible. We feel that the real wage is more likely to be stationary
than the nominal one. In case the real wage is non-stationary, we compute regressions in
di⁄erences and ￿nd results almost identical to those we obtain in levels.
6prevailing national minimum wage. We also delete observations with real
wages above one hundred dollars. We investigate all individuals whose real
hourly wage exceeded ￿fty dollars in real earnings per hour in any sample
year. Our deletion decisions are based on the earnings pro￿le, education,
and occupation of these respondents.12 We analyze the population group,
gender, and college completion status of the excluded wage outliers and the
sample we keep; they are substantially similar. Thus, we feel con￿dent that
these sample deletions do not bias our results.
We use the following proxies for individual human capital: education,
labour market experience, tenure, and AFQT score. Educational attainment
data come from answers to the question: ￿What is the highest grade you
completed?￿We compute potential labour market experience as age minus
highest grade completed minus six. The AFQT score ￿is a general measure
of trainability￿(NLSY 2002) and proxies for innate ability; the score is age-
adjusted. ￿Married, spouse present￿is a dichotomous variable often included
in Mincerian regressions to proxy for a number of unobservable factors at the
individual level that are related to productivity. An alternative justi￿cation
for its inclusion is that respondents with a spouse can split home production
responsibilities, which leaves more time for work. The NLSY79 also has a
dichotomous variable for health limitations, which identi￿es respondents with
health problems that restrict their ability to work.
All NLSY79 respondents were born between 1957 and 1964. We drop
individuals in a given year who reported attending either an elementary,
middle, or high school or college since the last interview. These individu-
als are not part of the labour force. We drop any observation where data
are missing for one or more of our variables. Because we consider the deci-
sion to work an endogenous choice, we ￿t a sample selection equation. For
the purposes of this equation, our sample has 9,306 individuals and 104,331
person-years. For the wage equation, we drop observations for which the
respondent reported an activity during the survey week other than ￿work-
ing￿(e.g., unemployed, keeping house, unable to work); observations with a
non-positive wage are also dropped. After these deletions, the sample for the
wage equation consists of 7,344 individuals and 65,882 person-years.
12The Center for Human Resource Research, which compiles raw NLSY79 data into
hourly wage, does not correct abnormally high or low wage outcomes. These wages could
be a result of an interviewer￿ s inputting mistake or respondent mistruth, or they could be
correct. For this reason, we felt it necessary to investigate these cases individually.
73.2 The CPS
We consider the respondent￿ s state as the surrounding labour market. We
proxy for state-level human capital using the percentage of college graduates
for each state and Washington, D.C.13 Data for the percentage of college
graduates come from the CPS. In calculating the percentage of college grad-
uates, we drop CPS respondents younger than 25 to eliminate those currently
in school. We also drop those older than 65, since they are likely to be out
of the labour force. Prior to 1992, the CPS collected data on years of ed-
ucation instead of data on completed degrees. For those years, we consider
respondents with at least four years of college to be college graduates.
Rauch (1993), Rudd (2000), Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), and Ciccone
and Peri (2002) use the mean highest grade completed as the proxy for hu-
man capital. We feel that the percentage of college graduates is preferable
for two reasons: multicollinearity and the distribution of educational at-
tainment. Multicollinearity among the regressors increases the di¢ culty of
separating their e⁄ect on wages. By construction, individual highest grade
completed and its statewide mean are highly correlated.14 There is a smaller
correlation, however, between the percentage of college graduates and indi-
vidual highest grade completed. An increase in an individual￿ s highest grade
completed only increases the statewide percentage of college graduates in the
case where the increase is from 15 (completion of junior year in college) to 16
(a college graduate). Most other gains in schooling increase the likelihood of
a higher percentage of college graduates in the future, but do not a⁄ect this
variable contemporaneously. Conditioning-number tests for multicollinearity,
recommended by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980), con￿rm this logic. These
tests suggest that multicollinearity is present between our other regressors
and both human capital proxies; the mean highest grade completed exhibits
a higher degree of multicollinearity than the statewide percentage of college
graduates.
In addition, there is evidence that the distribution of highest grade com-
pleted is both bimodal and skewed to the right. In general, the mean is a poor
summary statistic for skewed distributions, especially bimodal ones. The bi-
13Moretti (2004a) also uses percentage of college graduates as his proxy for local human
capital, although he uses MSAs as his local labour market (instead of states).
14This is true even when the individual data are taken from the NLSY79 and the
statewide averages are based on the CPS, to the extent that both data sets are random
samples from the same data-generating process.
8modal aspect of the distribution is likely a by-product of discrete jumps at
high school and college graduations, known as ￿sheepskin e⁄ects.￿Studies
of the wage-schooling pro￿le suggest returns to education are not linear in
years of schooling attainment. Regardless of their cause￿ discrete jumps in
skill, signalling value of graduation, etc.￿ sheepskin e⁄ects in￿ uence educa-
tion decisions, causing people to cluster at a terminal high school degree and
a terminal college degree.15 We use percentage of college graduates as our
proxy for statewide human capital based on these considerations.
Ideally, one would want to introduce some measure of school quality, since
college degrees are heterogeneous. Unfortunately, we cannot disaggregate
data on statewide college graduation by the quality of that education.
4. The Empirical Model
To test equation (7), we need to estimate a Mincerian regression. Section
2 showed that both h and E [h] are endogenous.16 We estimate ￿rst-stage
regressions and use instrumental variables for individual and average human
capital to obtain consistent estimates of the marginal e⁄ect of h and E [h]
on wages.17
4.1 First-stage regressions
Because the NLSY79 is a panel, individual highest grade completed is not
constant over time for all individuals. For example, some respondents could
have two ￿spells￿in the labour force if they did not go directly to college from
high school, causing variation across time in their educational attainment.
We must estimate separate ￿rst-stage models for those with interrupted-
schooling behaviour and those without. In addition, there are two types of
uninterrupted-schooling individuals: those who completed their education
prior to the start of the panel in 1979, and those who completed it after-
wards. Therefore, we use three separate regressions to instrument for the
15We address the endogeneity of educational attainment by using instrumental variables.
16Ordinary least squares regressions and Hausman tests con￿rm that h and E [h] are
also endogenous in our data.
17Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) show that it is necessary to treat both statewide and
individual human capital as endogenous to guarantee consistent estimates. Moretti (2004a)
uses instrumental variables for average human capital. Our instrumental variables section
borrows from these papers to some extent.
9highest grade completed. For the uninterrupted-schooling individuals, whose
education was completed before 1979, we ￿t the following regression:
hgci =  0 +  1mhgci +  2fhgci +  3afqti +  4volposi +  5volnegi +
8 X
r=6
 rpggir + "1i; (9)
where hgc is highest grade completed; mhgc and fhgc are, respectively,
mother￿ s and father￿ s highest grade completed; afqt is the individual￿ s score
on the Armed Forces Quali￿cation Test; and pggi are three dummy variables
for population group and gender￿ speci￿cally, blacks, Hispanics, and females
(white males are the omitted category). The two dummy variables, volpos
and volneg, indicate that the respondent left school voluntarily for ￿positive￿
reasons and ￿negative￿reasons, respectively.18 This regression allows for the
possibility that human capital acquisition is a⁄ected by family background,
intelligence, and tendencies to acquire human capital that may di⁄er by gen-
der and population group.19 These non-time-varying factors do not enter the
second-stage wage regression, since they are absorbed by an individual-level
￿xed e⁄ect. We use the reason why an individual left school before 1979￿
positive, negative, or involuntary￿ as the instrumental variable for highest
grade completed. The NLSY asked why a respondent left school only if the
respondent was not in school in 1979. These ￿reason-for-leaving￿variables
a⁄ect education decisions but are not likely to be correlated with the un-
explained portion of their wage at a later date. We estimate the following
regression for uninterrupted-schooling individuals who left school in 1979 or
later:
18The omitted category is ￿left school involuntarily.￿These three dummy variables are
constructed from 12 separate responses to the question ￿What is the main reason you
left [school] at that time?￿Details regarding which responses are positive, negative, and
involuntary are provided in the appendix.
19There is evidence that these e⁄ects of di⁄erential tendencies to acquire human capital
by population group are diminishing over time. In 1940 (based on census data), on average,
whites had more than three years more education than blacks or Hispanics. By 2000, that
gap had closed to less than two years for Hispanics and less than one year for blacks. We
make no attempt to explain the source of these tendencies.





where E1979 [hgci] designates the highest grade that individuals expect to
complete. Expected education is the instrument for the uninterrupted-schoolers
who ￿nished school after 1979. The NLSY asked this question only in
1979. We feel that individuals￿expectations of their highest grade completed
(formed in 1979) is unlikely to be correlated with the unexplained portion of
their wages several years later, when they have left school and are earning a
wage.
For interrupted-schooling individuals, whose highest grade completed
changes over time, we ￿t the following regression:
hgcit = ￿0 + ￿1mhgci + ￿2fhgci + ￿3afqti + ￿4E1979 [hgci] +
7 X
r=5
￿rpggir + ￿8ageit + "3it; (11)
where age is the age of the individual at time t. In our wage regression, we
combine all of these types of individuals, using the ￿tted values from (9),
(10), and (11). This combination of ￿tted values has the potential to create
heteroscedastic errors. In all our wage regressions, we correct the errors for
this and other sources of heteroscedasticity; our discussion is below.
We also need instrumental variables for statewide college share, which is
our proxy for statewide human capital. It is plausible that college share and
wages are a⁄ected by variables unobserved in the wage equation (7). For ex-
ample, high wages in a given state may increase demand for schooling in that
state, which increases the level of human capital. Alternatively, high-skilled
workers may migrate to states with high wages. This endogeneity biases
the coe¢ cient on the percentage of college graduates in the wage equation,
which is our estimate of the net e⁄ect of statewide human capital on wages.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Ciccone and Peri (2002), Rudd (2000), and
Moretti (2004a) account for this potential endogeneity in their models, al-
though they use di⁄erent speci￿cations. We follow Moretti (2004a) and use






where p indexes age strata in years (from 25 to 65, inclusive), fps denotes
the fraction of the population of state s that was in stratum p in 1970, and
nmcolpt indicates the nationwide fraction of college graduates in stratum p
at time t.20 Use of the 1970 age distribution ensures that this variable is
exogenous to the wage equation error term, since there is no reason to be-
lieve that the 1970 age distribution a⁄ects the unexplained component of
wages between 1979 and 2000. The nationwide fraction of college graduates
is also orthogonal to the wage equation error, for two reasons. First, nation-
wide college share is not a⁄ected by non-random migration within the United
States. Second, since there are 51 ￿states,￿none of which is large relative
to the whole, endogenous changes in college share in one state barely change
the national average. As with Moretti (2004a), we argue that ivst is corre-
lated with the endogenous statewide human capital variable via the national
upward trend in education over the sample period. States with ￿young￿pop-
ulations in 1970 are likely to have the largest share of college graduates in the
years after 1979 (i.e., during the sample). We account for the endogeneity of
mcol in the following ￿xed-e⁄ects regression:
mcolst = ￿1ivst + ￿2s + "4st: (13)
To simplify the interpretation of the results, we omit the constant term
and include all of the state-level ￿xed e⁄ects, instead of omitting one of the
￿xed e⁄ects and including a constant term.
Finally, although it is not our purpose to model labour supply, we need to
control for the potential bias introduced by respondents in the sample who
are not working. This is particularly problematic, since we estimate spillover
e⁄ects across population group, gender, and college completion status, cre-
ating subsamples that di⁄er substantially in their labour supply. We ￿t a
standard employment probit model to the entire sample, and use the ￿tted
values from this as the Heckman regressor in the wage regression. Our model
is:
20Moretti￿ s (2004a) instrumental variable regression uses the ￿rst di⁄erence of nmcolpt.









r=7 ￿rcontrolrit + "5it
1
A; (14)
where edu1 denotes the possession of a high school diploma, edu2 denotes
the possession of a college degree, unemp is the lagged state unemployment
rate, pgg are the population group and gender variables used in equations (8)￿
(10) and the controls are, respectively, urban resident, health limitations, and
married, spouse present. Since this is a probit regression, ￿ is the standard
Gaussian density function. Our identifying instrument is the lagged state
unemployment rate, which we expect to be orthogonal to the unexplained
portion of an individual￿ s wage. With the ￿tted values for highest grade
completed and average statewide college completion, as well as the Heckman
term from the probit regression, we are ready to consider the speci￿cation of
the wage regression.
4.2 Second-stage regressions
We begin by ￿tting a standard Mincerian regression, inspired by (7):




I (i 2 s;t) ￿ d mcolst + X
0
it￿ + "6it;
where hats above variables denote the ￿tted values from the ￿rst-stage re-
gressions and I is an indicator variable that equals one if person i lives in
state s at time t, and zero otherwise. Mincerian regressions typically include
a dummy variable for college graduation; the estimated coe¢ cient captures
the sheepskin e⁄ect. But for respondents who did not interrupt their school-
ing, their college completion dummy is perfectly correlated with their ￿xed
e⁄ect. To avoid this problem but still account for sheepskin e⁄ects, we com-
pute two individual human capital variables using the estimates from the
￿rst-stage individual human capital regression: d hgc is the ￿tted value from
the ￿rst stage and cg is a dummy variable equalling one if d hgc ￿ 16. As
shown above, for those with a college degree and higher, the marginal bene-
￿t of an additional year of schooling is the sum of the coe¢ cients of d hgc and
13d hgc￿cg.21 There are seven other control variables, standard to Mincerian re-
gressions: work experience and its square, tenure at the individual￿ s current
job and its square, whether the individual has health limitations, whether the
individual is married with spouse present, and whether the individual lives
in an urban area. Although less common in the Mincerian literature, we
also include two ￿macroeconomic￿control variables, log gross state product
(GSP) and a time trend. GSP accounts for the variation in growth across
states. Assuming that statewide economic growth and human capital are
positively correlated, omitting GSP from the model will bias the estimate
of the spillover e⁄ect, since economic growth likely a⁄ects statewide educa-
tion (via migration) and individual wages.22 A time trend is not usually
included in panel regressions, but log GSP is trend stationary.23 Including
a trend-stationary regressor without a time trend makes the distribution of
the regression error non-stationary. If the regression error is non-stationary,
its distribution may not converge to the normal distribution￿ a fact that
complicates inference. These nine control variables are included in the X0
it
row vector in equation (15).
We estimate another version of (15) to account for spillover di⁄erences
across subsamples:




I (i 2 m) ￿ ￿m
51 X
s=1
I (i 2 s;t) ￿ d mcolst + X
0
it￿ + "7it;(16)
21Because of multicollinearity problems, it is not possible to include d hgc, cg, and their
product in the same regressions. We encounter similar problems if we include interaction
terms of d mcol with dummies for our 12 subsamples as well as those dummies themselves.
As a robustness check (in both cases), we try including only the linear terms and dropping
the interaction terms; for variables included in both regressions, the results are broadly
similar.
22Nominal GSP is the sum of the ￿nal output of a state multiplied by the prices of
those outputs. We create real GSP by dividing by the national CPI-U. To the extent that
there are interstate variations in prices, they remain in our variable, log real GSP. Since
wage bargaining may be a⁄ected by the local price level, log real GSP may be correlated
with the error term of the wage equation, thus biasing the results. The simple correlation
coe¢ cient between log real GSP and the residuals is about 2.5 per cent, which suggests
that this potential source of endogeneity is not a problem in our sample.
23Stationarity test results con￿rming that log GSP is trend-stationary in this sample
are available upon request.
14where m indexes subsamples. We create 12 subsamples by dividing the sam-
ple along three axes: college educated versus not college educated, population
groups (whites, blacks, and Hispanics), and gender. We perform t-tests to
determine that the ￿m are di⁄erent from one another.
For regressions (15) and (16), we use standard errors corrected for general
forms of heteroscedasticity, as in White (1980).24 Moulton (1986) provides
an alternative methodology for addressing heteroscedasticity, known as clus-
tered errors. He considers the case where the regression errors have common
variance but are correlated within groups and uncorrelated across groups.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) use state-time clustering. For our model, the
logical cluster is at the state-time level, since individual-level shocks are ac-
counted for in the ￿xed e⁄ect. If we clustered on the state of residence alone,
it would be similar to estimating a state ￿xed e⁄ect.25 Clustering on time
alone assumes that all states experience a random shock in a given year,
which is inconsistent with our view that the state is the relevant local labour
market in which spillovers may occur.26
We reject the use of clustered errors for four principal reasons. First, the
￿xed e⁄ect absorbs much of the state-level shocks. This is particularly true
for non-migrants, whose state of residence does not change throughout the
sample. Second, we are unaware of any paper using clustered errors in a panel
data context, and thus their statistical properties are unknown. Third, we
test for residual correlation by drawing random samples of pairs of residuals
from the second-stage regression. Each member of each pair came from the
same state-time combination. Simple correlation coe¢ cients averaged over
100 samples of 100 pairs each are about 2 per cent. This diagnostic technique
suggests that clustered errors are not necessary for this data set. Fourth, the
results using clustering are broadly similar to those using White (1980) errors.
24We also check the second-stage residuals of the three types of individuals in our sample
(those who interrupted their schooling, those who did not and ￿nished after 1979, and those
who had completed their schooling before 1979), to determine whether their distributions
are the same; we ￿nd that they are.
25We tried a version of our model with state ￿xed e⁄ects, but found that most of them
were insigni￿cant.
26Estimating a ￿xed-e⁄ects regression with clustered errors is an option using STATA￿ s
￿areg￿command.
155. Results
5.1 First-stage regression results
Table 2 provides results of the ￿rst-stage individual human capital regres-
sions for those who did not interrupt their schooling and left school prior to
1979. As expected, parents￿educational outcomes positively a⁄ect the child￿ s
highest grade completed. There are positive coe¢ cients for blacks and His-
panics (whites are the omitted category), likely caused by faster growth in
education for blacks and Hispanics than for whites, which produces a larger
di⁄erence between each generation￿ s education. The instrumental variables
for this group are dummy variables for the reason the respondent voluntarily
left school, condensed into positive reasons and negative reasons. Leaving
school involuntarily is the omitted category. Those who leave school for
positive reasons, such as graduation, stay in school longer. Similarly, those
who leave school for negative reasons obtain less education. Both of these
instruments are statistically signi￿cant.
Table 3 reports results of the ￿rst-stage individual human capital re-
gressions for those who did not interrupt their schooling patterns but left
school after 1979. Parents￿educational outcomes and AFQT have positive
and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on education. The coe¢ cient for blacks
is positive and statistically signi￿cant, which is again a likely by-product of
faster growth in education than for whites. The instrumental variable for
this group is the expectation of highest grade, formed in 1979, which has a
positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the actual educational outcome.
Table 4 provides results of the ￿rst-stage individual human capital regres-
sions for those with interrupted schooling patterns. Since this subset of the
sample has time-varying educational outcomes, we include a time-varying re-
gressor: age. Among this group, highest grade completed is positively related
to parents￿educational outcomes, AFQT, and whether the respondent is in
the black population group. Highest grade completed is negatively related to
whether the respondent is in the Hispanic population group, indicating that
Hispanics that interrupt their schooling have slower education growth than
whites who do likewise. The instrumental variable for this group is again the
expectation of highest grade completed, formed in 1979, which has a positive
and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the actual educational outcome.
Table 5 reports results of the employment selection equation. All variables
have the expected sign: positive e⁄ects from education, marriage, and urban
16status; negative e⁄ects from blacks, females, and Hispanics; and health lim-
itations. The instrumental variable is the lagged unemployment rate, which
has a negative e⁄ect on employment.
For brevity, we suppress the results of the ￿rst-stage regression of statewide
college share on Moretti￿ s (2004a) exogenous age structure variable and state
controls (i.e., equation (13)). The coe¢ cient estimate for the age structure
variable is 0.96 with a t-statistic of 43.71, which suggests that the instrument
is highly correlated with statewide college share.
5.2 Second-stage regression results
Table 6 provides results of the second stage using predicted values for hgc and
mcol. We ￿nd evidence of spillover e⁄ects. A 1 percentage point increase in
college share increases individual wages by about 3 per cent. Moretti (2004a)
and Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) report smaller positive spillover estimates,
although only Moretti￿ s are statistically signi￿cant. Prior to college gradua-
tion, the marginal return to schooling is 7 per cent, which is consistent with
other Mincerian estimates. We ￿nd the familiar concave marginal e⁄ects of
experience and tenure, and expected signs for health limitations; married,
spouse present; urban status; and GSP. The time-trend variable is not sta-
tistically di⁄erent from zero, which suggests that the time trends in other
regressors and in log wages ￿cancel out￿the time trend in log GSP.
5.3 Second-stage results: the subsamples model
The model in Table 6 assumes that all subsamples receive the same spillover
e⁄ect. In the extant spillover literature, only Moretti (2004a, b) considers the
possibility of group-speci￿c spillovers, ￿nding that college graduates receive
a smaller spillover e⁄ect than non-college graduates. There could also be
di⁄erences among other observable dimensions, such as population group
and gender, perhaps caused by discrimination or di⁄erences in the occupation
distribution of each subsample. Our model does not attempt to address these
issues. Table 7 provides results for the model with separate spillover e⁄ects
for each of our 12 subsamples. These results show that there is variation in
the spillover e⁄ect across our subsamples. The spillover e⁄ect ranges from
1.5 per cent (non-college-educated black males) to over 5 per cent (college-
educated white males) across our 12 subsamples. The other variables in the
17model have coe¢ cients that are similar to those in Table 4. The time-trend
variable is again negative, but now statistically signi￿cant.
5.4 Comparison of spillover e⁄ects
We perform t-tests to ￿nd statistical di⁄erences between pairs of spillover









has an asymptotic standard
normal distribution, provided that the subgroups for which ^ ￿1 and ^ ￿2 are
estimated are non-overlapping. We exploit the non-overlapping feature of
our subgroups to make proper inferences.28
The ￿rst type of di⁄erence we identify is the ￿college e⁄ect,￿or di⁄er-
ences in the spillover coe¢ cients between those who have a college degree and
those who do not. Economic theory suggests that this e⁄ect may be positive
or negative. Supply e⁄ects imply that an increase in college graduates will
reduce the spillover return to obtaining a college degree; this is the e⁄ect
found by Moretti (2004a). Alternatively, knowledge sharing between work-
ers may cause increasing returns to statewide human capital accumulation.
We ￿nd a positive college e⁄ect for two of our six comparison groups: white
males and black males. In coarser cuts of the data, there is no statistical
di⁄erence between the spillover for college graduates and non-college gradu-
ates. We believe that treating both hgc and mcol as endogenous in addition
to our macroeconomic control variables accounts for the di⁄erence between
Moretti￿ s (2004a) estimates and ours.
We ￿nd gender e⁄ects for three of the six comparisons: whites who
are college educated, Hispanics who are college educated, and whites who
do not have a college degree. In each comparison, males receive a larger
spillover bene￿t than females. Interestingly, we ￿nd no evidence of male-
female spillover di⁄erences when the data are cut by gender only, and we
ignore spillover di⁄erences across population group and college completion.
These results suggest that cutting the data by gender only does not tell the
full story.
27The t-test for di⁄erences does not rely on the individual estimates being signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. Signi￿cant di⁄erences can be ascertained as long as estimates of the
coe¢ cients and their variances are consistent.
28In the NLSY79 data, whites, blacks, and Hispanics are non-overlapping categories,
which is not the case in Census Bureau or CPS data.
18Between whites and blacks, we ￿nd e⁄ects in two of the four comparisons:
men who are college educated, and men who do not have a college degree. In
each case, whites receive a larger spillover e⁄ect than blacks. Between blacks
and Hispanics, we ￿nd population group e⁄ects for two of the four compar-
isons: men who are college educated and men who are not college educated.
Hispanics receive a larger spillover e⁄ect than blacks in both. Between whites
and Hispanics, only white men who are college educated receive a statisti-
cally di⁄erent spillover than Hispanic women who are college educated. All
of the signi￿cantly di⁄erent population group and college e⁄ects are among
males. Based on our explanation for spillovers, this empirical regularity sug-
gests that women may be more likely to share information across population
groups and educational status.
We identify three types of spillover di⁄erentials (population group, gen-
der, and educational attainment). Can we explain these di⁄erentials using
observables? One explanation for di⁄ering spillover e⁄ects is in the types
of jobs held by di⁄erent subsamples. Interaction among workers facilitates
information sharing, which a⁄ects the spillover coe¢ cient. Presumably, the
amount of worker interaction di⁄ers across jobs because of di⁄erences in the
production process. Our interpretation of spillovers also requires some de-
gree of ￿ exibility in the production process to incorporate new information.
For example, the regimented production process of assembly-line workers
makes it unlikely that information sharing will a⁄ect productivity. We proxy
for these job-speci￿c di⁄erences using 12 broad occupation groups from the
1970 Census Bureau classi￿cation. We then run separate second-stage re-
gressions for each occupation group to test for spillover di⁄erences. Table 8
reports the results. Statistically signi￿cant point estimates range from -0.106
to 0.062. However, t-tests show that the di⁄erences in the spillover coe¢ cient
are not statistically di⁄erent from one another in nearly all of the pairwise
occupation comparisons.
To determine the explanatory power of occupational di⁄erences, we use
the spillover coe¢ cients for each occupation and each subsample￿ s occupation
distribution. Occupation di⁄erences can only predict the spillover di⁄erences
across subsamples if there are systematic di⁄erences in occupation across sub-
samples. We examine this empirical question and begin by computing the
empirical distribution of participation in 12 broad occupation groups by sub-
sample. Let ￿m be the empirical distribution of occupations for subsample
m. We assume that this distribution is a consistent estimator of the true
distribution. We place the spillover coe¢ cients for each occupation reported
19in Table 8 in ￿o: Let ￿m be the vector of coe¢ cients on d mcol interacted with
our 12 subsamples strati￿ed by population group, gender, and college com-
pletion status. We test whether the product ￿0
o￿m is a good predictor of ￿m
by linear regression, ￿nding an adjusted R2 of about 0.2. Thus, occupation
has limited predictive power for spillover e⁄ects.
It is also possible that imperfect knowledge sharing drives the di⁄erences
in spillover e⁄ects. Prejudices against, and favouritism towards, a speci￿c
subsample disrupt the ￿ ow of information among workers, causing produc-
tivity di⁄erences. While it would be ideal to test this hypothesis directly,
it is di¢ cult to do so for two reasons. First, our information-transmission
explanation refutes Rauch￿ s contention that statewide human capital is a
public good, since imperfect knowledge sharing implies some degree of ex-
cludability. It is more di¢ cult to measure excludability (i.e., the absence
of communication or spillovers) than it is to measure inclusiveness or the
presence of spillovers. Second, although there is a substantial literature on
labour market discrimination beginning with Becker (1957), this literature
is not easily applied to spillover discrimination. For these reasons, we do
not test for discrimination. Rather, we say that 20 per cent of the spillover
di⁄erences is attributable to occupational choice, which leaves 80 per cent of
the di⁄erence unexplained.
6. Conclusions
There is no current consensus regarding the impact of an increase in average
human capital on individual wages. Economic theory suggests that human
capital accumulation in a labour market a⁄ects individual wages in both di-
rections. An increase in the supply of highly skilled workers decreases the
wages of all highly skilled workers. But human capital accumulation also
increases the stock of knowledge. Workers share some of this information,
which raises their productivity and wages. Identi￿cation of the net e⁄ect of
statewide human capital accumulation on individual wages presents several
challenges. Proxies for statewide human capital are almost certain to be
endogenous in the wage equation, because of factors such as non-random mi-
gration or local-speci￿c growth shocks. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) show
that it is also necessary to treat individual human capital as endogenous if
the average human capital variable is constructed from data on individual
human capital. A reliable estimate of spillover e⁄ects is an important fac-
20tor in decisions on public education funding, since spillovers represent the
externality that all citizens enjoy of marginal increases in statewide human
capital.
Our contributions to the literature are two-fold. First, we ￿nd posi-
tive e⁄ects from statewide human capital accumulation; i.e., the knowledge
spillover e⁄ect dominates the supply e⁄ect. A 1 percentage point increase in
college graduates in a given state increases individual wages by about
3 per cent. We ￿nd that all workers receive spillovers, regardless of whether
we consider an aggregate sample or various disaggregated subsamples. Sec-
ond, spillovers are not equal for all groups of workers. In general, spillovers
are largest for whites and smallest for blacks, larger for the college educated
than for those who do not have a college degree, and larger for men than they
are for women. We estimate that roughly 20 per cent of these spillover di⁄er-
ences are attributable to di⁄erences in the distribution of broad occupation
groups across subsamples. Our theoretical and empirical models are neither
able to support nor to negate an explanation of spillover di⁄erences based on
prejudice or favouritism. Our results suggest future spillover research should
account for these di⁄erences in spillovers across groups. In addition, deter-
mining the cause of spillover di⁄erences across population groups, gender, or
education level may provide insight into how the spillover externality works
and into policies to encourage spillovers.
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Log wage 1.91 0.48
Highest grade
completed: hat 12.90 1.85
Mean
college: hat 22.57 2.21
Experience 9.51 5.40
Tenure 3.61 3.89
Health limitations 0.04 0.20
Married,
spouse present 0.52 0.50
Urban 0.78 0.42
Log gross
state product 11.78 0.88
Expected highest
grade completed 13.83 2.48
Mother￿ s highest
grade completed 11.06 3.04
Father￿ s highest






Quali￿cation Test 52.27 27.86
24Table 2: First Stage: Non-Interrupted, Left before 1979






























N 2204 R2 0.4517
Table 3: First Stage: Non-Interrupted, Left after 1979

























N 3273 R2 0.5897
25Table 4: First Stage: Interrupted





























N 18015 R2 0.4940
Table 5: Probit Results
































N 104331 Pseudo-R2 0.1076
26Table 6: Second-Stage Results: Single Population












































N 65882 R2 0.3116
27Table 7: Second-Stage Results: 12 Subsamples





































































































N 65882 R2 0.3107
28Table 8: Regression Results by Occupation
Occupation Spillover Std. error N
Professional/Technical workers 0.045 0.0090 10009
Managers/Administrators (non-farm) 0.062 0.0121 7227
Sales workers 0.054 0.0231 3120
Clerical and unskilled workers 0.034 0.0064 13848
Craftsmen 0.052 0.0103 7804
Operatives (non-transport) 0.028 0.0097 7243
Transport operatives 0.001 0.0198 2645
Labourers (non-farm) 0.033 0.0162 4165
Farmers/Farm managers -0.375 0.2340 88
Farm labourers/Foremen -0.106 0.0538 427
Service workers (non-private) 0.023 0.0099 8892
Private household workers 0.151 0.1723 187
29Appendix
A.1 Data Abbreviations
afqt: score on the Armed Forces Quali￿cation Test
edu1: high school graduate
edu2: college graduate
cg: dummy, one if the respondent is a college graduate
control: health limitations; married, spouse present; or urban
fhgc: father￿ s highest grade completed
hgc: highest grade completed
mcol: the percentage of college graduates, by state of residence
mhgc: mother￿ s highest grade completed
pgg: population group or gender dummy; i.e., blacks, females, or Hispan-
ics
time: a time trend
unemp: state unemployment rate, annual
urban: respondent lives in an urban area
A.2 Variable De￿nitions: Dummies for Reasons for
Leaving School
Voluntary positive: received degree, completed coursework, got married,
home responsibilities, got good job, or entered military
Voluntary negative: pregnancy, poor grades/low ability, did not like
school or moved away from school
Involuntary: expelled, suspended, school became too dangerous, ￿nancial
di¢ culties
Respondents who did not list one of these 12 answers were deleted as
missing data.
We consider the separation of these reasons for leaving school somewhat
arbitrary and certainly subject to debate.
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